The U.S.-Saudi Alliance: Enduring Interests in an Era of Shifting Realities

Associated Professor at Grand Valley State University and Non-Resident Fellow at the Middle East Institute, Washington D.C.

The defining turning point in U.S.-Saudi relations can be traced back to February 14, 1945, when King Abdulaziz met President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake, just outside the Suez Canal. This historic meeting marked the Saudi monarch’s first foreign trip and symbolized the kingdom’s entrance onto the global diplomatic stage.

The discussions focused on two critical issues: oil — where both sides reached a consensus — and Palestine, which remained a point of contention between the two leaders.

By the 1980s, however, the relationship had evolved into a strategic political alliance. Despite deep disagreements over the Palestinian issue, both nations united against the spread of Soviet communism. President Ronald Reagan’s “Reagan Doctrine” championed global anti-communist efforts, a position echoed by Saudi Arabia under King Fahd, who viewed communism as not only a geopolitical threat but also a militant, atheistic ideology that needed to be countered.

The Reagan Doctrine built upon the earlier “Truman Doctrine,” which sought to contain Soviet expansionism during the Cold War. Within this context, U.S.-Saudi cooperation became instrumental in supporting Afghan mujahideen, ultimately contributing to the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and its collapse in 1989.

The alliance was soon tested again. Following Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the U.S.-Saudi security pact was activated for the first time. President George H. W. Bush deployed nearly 697,000 American troops to Saudi Arabia to spearhead Operation Desert Storm, liberating Kuwait and neutralizing Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions.

Over time, shared threats continued to shape the alliance. The 1990s saw the emergence of international terrorism, led by former Afghan fighters influenced by extremist ideologies. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States became targets of this new menace. The rise of Osama bin Laden and the creation of al-Qaeda culminated in the September 11, 2001 attacks — the deadliest terrorist act in modern history.

The fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals shocked both Riyadh and Washington. In the United States, media criticism of Saudi Arabia intensified, with particular focus on domestic issues such as women’s rights and religious education. However, full-scale demonization of the kingdom did not materialize. As I argued in my book Saudi Arabia in Anglo-American Press: Coverage of the Kingdom During the 20th Century, “The September 11 attacks did not result in the demonization of Saudis in these media narratives. In fact, most articles published in the aftermath focused primarily on Saudi Arabia’s internal affairs” (p. 142).

President George W. Bush’s balanced and pragmatic approach helped mitigate the media fallout. He maintained close contact with Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan — a trusted confidant of the Bush family — and recognized that the attackers’ Saudi nationality did not reflect official Saudi hostility toward the United States.

In Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia, Middle East Institute scholar Thomas Lippman cites then-U.S. Ambassador to Riyadh, Robert Jordan, who noted:

“Among segments of society in both countries, reason has been replaced by emotion, fueled by ignorance, fear, disinformation, and at times outright lies. This has generated widespread anger, harming both nations. We must not let this continue. We cannot allow demagogues to shape our relationship, nor permit religious extremists to divide the world and ignite a clash of civilizations.” (p. 342)

Although Saudi Arabia supported the United States in its war on terror, it strongly opposed the invasion of Iraq, viewing it as a destabilizing threat to regional security. Riyadh refused to allow American forces to use its territory as a launchpad for the invasion. As a result, U.S. troops did not renew their presence in northeastern Saudi Arabia, a decision that, according to Lippman, was mutually agreed upon (pp. 342–343).

In a symbolic response to mounting criticism, then-Crown Prince Abdullah — later King — visited the United States in April 2002. His warm reception by President Bush at his Crawford, Texas ranch reflected the enduring strength of U.S.-Saudi relations and the close personal ties between the two families. Abdullah returned in April 2005, launching Saudi Arabia’s largest-ever scholarship program, which enabled tens of thousands of Saudis to pursue higher education in the United States.

The alliance would continue to experience fluctuations. During Barack Obama’s presidency, relations cooled due to diverging regional strategies. Under Donald Trump, ties were revitalized, only to face renewed strain with the election of Joe Biden. However, Trump’s return to office has once again shifted the dynamic.

As in his first term, Trump has designated Saudi Arabia as his first official overseas visit — technically the second due to an unscheduled stop at the Vatican to attend the Pope’s funeral. The visit, expected in mid-May 2025, comes on the heels of Riyadh’s expanded diplomatic role, particularly as a mediator in global conflicts. Notably, Saudi Arabia brokered U.S.-Russia talks this past February, solidifying its status as an influential international actor.

Today, the U.S.-Saudi alliance appears to be entering a golden phase. Riyadh’s growing political clout and increasing acceptance as a mediator in global disputes — from Ukraine to U.S.-Russia tensions — have given it considerable leverage in its relationship with Washington. Trump’s upcoming visit may offer further insight into the evolving contours of this strategic partnership.