Gulf Waters in the Barada River: A Conditional Embrace
Wrapped in Overstated Optimism

 

While it is premature to declare Syria—under transitional president Ahmad al-Shar’ and his domestic and international backers—a genuine ally of the Gulf states, it is equally difficult to overlook the strategic openings that have emerged since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The formation of a new transitional government, however fragile, has reopened doors long sealed for over a decade.

This new Syrian landscape has triggered a swift, albeit cautious, Gulf response—one characterized less by sweeping enthusiasm and more by exploratory pragmatism. Rather than rushing into a definitive alliance, Gulf capitals appear to be testing the waters with deliberate restraint.

Following his visit to Riyadh, President al-Shar’ continued his diplomatic tour with high-profile stops in Abu Dhabi and Doha, signaling a nascent thaw. In the UAE, his meeting with President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was carefully choreographed—symbolic in tone and language. The Emirati leadership offered public support for Syria’s reconstruction and stabilization, while simultaneously keeping open questions about the ideological character of the new regime, particularly its Islamist-leaning roots.

Doha, by contrast, extended a warmer reception. Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani personally welcomed al-Shar’ at the airport. The visit concluded with a pledge of immediate support to Syria’s struggling electricity sector. Qatari media coverage and popular sentiment reflected a positive tone, yet this should not be mistaken for an unequivocal commitment to a long-term alliance. While Qatar appears more receptive than its Gulf peers, it is unlikely to engage deeply without the reassurance of direct U.S. oversight—and certainly not on ground that has yet to stabilize.

The Gulf’s embrace of al-Shar’ reflects a desire to explore potential pathways rather than finalize any strategic partnership. Each actor in this evolving scene is feeling its way forward, weighing risks against rewards. Syria’s transitional leadership is seeking legitimacy and financial support, while Gulf states are watching closely to determine whether Damascus is a viable partner—or merely a fragile state drifting into Turkey’s expanding regional sphere of influence.

Ambitions Meet Reality

Gulf capitals—particularly Riyadh and Abu Dhabi—view post-Assad Syria as a critical arena for expanding regional influence and reintegrating Damascus into the Arab fold. Yet this ambition runs headlong into a complex and disorienting geopolitical equation. Turkey holds significant sway on the ground, with entrenched military, logistical, and political influence woven into the very fabric of Syria’s new transitional institutions. Meanwhile, the United States continues to hold the strings of the sanctions regime, and Russia—though its footprint has diminished—remains an actor that cannot be dismissed entirely.

The Gulf states are banking on “reconstruction diplomacy” as their primary tool for influence, but this path is riddled with constraints. Western sanctions on Syria remain firmly in place, severely limiting the space for Gulf financial engagement. While Washington has granted narrow exceptions—such as for humanitarian aid and funding basic salaries—it has not offered a green light for broader economic re-entry into the Syrian market.

Complicating matters further, Gulf positions toward President Ahmad al-Shar’ are far from unified. Qatar, Turkey’s closest Gulf ally, has shown a more enthusiastic and forward-leaning posture. In contrast, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have adopted a cautious, calculated pragmatism—tinged with unease over the Islamist pedigree of Syria’s new leadership. Adding to that anxiety is the heavy presence of Islamist armed factions that surround and, in many ways, dominate the new regime’s military, security, and intelligence structures.

An On-the-Ground Vacuum

Unlike Turkey, which maintains a deeply embedded and operational presence within Syria’s emerging power structure, the Gulf states lack any meaningful military or territorial foothold in the country. Their involvement so far has been limited to diplomatic gestures, financial promises, and media engagement—leaving their actual influence subject to the approval or tolerance of more entrenched actors, notably Ankara and Washington.

While the Gulf powers are not seeking direct confrontation with Turkey over Syria, both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are unwilling to see Iranian hegemony in Damascus replaced with a new Turkish dominance. Consequently, any Gulf support to the new Syrian government is likely to come with clear conditions—chief among them, that Syria not become a launchpad for Ankara’s broader regional ambitions.

In effect, the Gulf is attempting to draw a careful line—avoiding open conflict with Turkey while also resisting Ankara’s unchecked consolidation of influence in Syria. This raises the question: is there, perhaps behind closed doors, a degree of coordination between Riyadh and Ankara aimed at delineating roles and setting mutual red lines that neither side is willing to cross?

Washington: Cautious Engagement Without Recognition

Although the United States welcomed the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the resulting blow to Iran—long one of his chief allies—it has stopped short of recognizing Syria’s new transitional government. The hesitation is rooted in a clear concern: several key figures now leading the transition were formerly affiliated with armed factions that remain on U.S. terrorism watchlists.

While Washington is committed to preventing the collapse of the Syrian state, it is wary of endorsing a successor that may prove more ideologically extreme—or at the very least, less pliable—than the regime it replaced.

Instead, the U.S. has maintained sanctions on the former regime while selectively opening humanitarian channels. This reflects a strategy akin to “conditional containment”: any future support from Washington is expected to be met with corresponding reforms and a broader, more inclusive governance structure. U.S. policy is contingent on several factors, chief among them: continued counterterrorism efforts against ISIS, ensuring Israeli security, and the new government’s position on former American allies in the region—particularly the Kurdish forces. These issues will shape Washington’s engagement and determine the contours of its future support.

Nonetheless, the U.S.’s deeply pragmatic approach to foreign policy gives the new Syrian leadership, led by President Ahmad al-Shar’, a clearer sense of what Washington expects—and what could provoke pushback.

On the other hand, if the new Syrian government fails to dismantle the legacy of jihadist factions and reduce their grip on state institutions, it is unlikely to achieve Western legitimacy. Worse still, it could face a renewed round of sanctions—or find itself sliding into diplomatic isolation once more.

Three Possible Scenarios

Looking ahead, Gulf relations with the new Syrian government could follow one of three primary trajectories:

1. Cautious Containment:

In this scenario, Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE—would offer only limited support to Syria, maintaining diplomatic engagement within carefully defined boundaries. No major commitments or exceptional initiatives would be pursued. This outcome is likely if Riyadh and Abu Dhabi come to view Turkish influence in Damascus as overwhelming and not worth directly contesting.

2. Pragmatic Partnership:

Here, relations would be grounded in clear mutual interests. The Gulf states would extend economic aid and reconstruction support, but only under strict conditions: domestic reforms, a reduction in Turkish sway, and transparent security and intelligence cooperation. The Gulf would also seek guarantees that Syria does not become a safe haven for extremist groups or oppositional Islamist forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical jihadist factions that threaten regional stability.

3. Disengagement or Reversal:

If the transitional government in Damascus underperforms politically, or if Ankara consolidates full control over Syrian decision-making, or if Washington pressures Gulf capitals to withdraw their support—then relations could deteriorate rapidly. In such a case, the current thaw may give way to a sudden rupture, sending Gulf–Syria ties back to square one.

Despite some positive signals, Gulf engagement with Syria remains tentative and tactical—not yet strategic. It is driven more by geography, alliances, and security concerns than by sentiment or historical affinity. For this relationship to yield meaningful results, Gulf financial support must be tied to real political reforms inside Syria and include safeguards to prevent that aid from being co-opted by external actors.

Furthermore, some form of coordination with Turkey will be necessary—whether through direct diplomatic channels or via intermediaries—to avoid policy clashes and ensure regional coherence.

Finally, leveraging the collective weight of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and expanding the Arab engagement track—with the involvement of Jordan and Egypt—could lend Gulf efforts in Syria greater political depth, resilience, and strategic legitimacy. Such a broader alignment would help counterbalance competing regional agendas and offer a more sustainable platform for re-engagement with Damascus.