Is Britain Returning Back to Complete the Unaccomplished Mission in the Gulf?

The British government would continue from where it left off in 1971. This requires re-gathering the small Sheikhdoms and imposing balances to repel the dominance of the “bigger”.

Despite the expected Gulf regimes’ evasion of reform entitlements, the urgent need for an international partner, in a level such as Britain, will necessitate them to listen and gradually disengage from the deliberate idleness of the transition to constitutional monarchies.

“The presence of the Royal Navy in Bahrain is guaranteed into the future, ensuring Britain’s sustained presence east of Suez. The new facility will enable Britain to work with our allies to reinforce stability in the Gulf and beyond.” November 1, 2015, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, commenting on the construction of the first permanent British military base in the Middle East since 1971, which most of its £15m ($23m) building costs paid by Bahrain, while the British pay running costs. [1]

Has the British Foreign Office changed their interpretation of “stability” from it was before centuries?

A Confidential FO memorandum respecting British interests in the Gulf, issued on 12 February 1908 states that:

“The situation of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf has been well described as unique; for although, with the slight exceptions referred to, she has at no time enjoyed, or even asked for, territorial acquisitions in those regions, she has for generations borne burdens there which no other nation has ever undertaken anywhere, except in the capacity of sovereign; she has had duty thrust upon her without dominion; she has kept the peace amongst people who are not her subjects (…).If Great Britain has become, in any sense, the arbiter and guardian of the Gulf, it has not been through a restless ambition urging her on to the control of the waste places of the earth, but in obedience to the calls that have been made upon her in the past to enforce peace between warring tribes, to give a free course to trade, to hold back the arm of the marauder and the oppressor, to stand between the slave-dealer and his victim.”[2]

Between colonialism, mandate, tutelage and protection, there were many idiomatic uses to express the British presence in the Gulf, which was determined by the treaties concluded with the littoral Sheikhdoms since 1820 until the final withdrawal from east of Suez in 1971. That presence did not only assure safe trade path between India and Europe via Iraq, but also added a distinguished value to British Empire among other competitive countries that failed to grab a foothold in the region at the time, such as Germany, France, Portugal and the Ottomans. That distinction, probably, was based on the nature of relationship with the Sheikhs of the Gulf who have found benefit in adhering to those treaties, which provided them with protection from adjacent ruling tribes, and, sometimes, from their rival peers within the same ruling house. Besides that, the British were insisting on localising their justice and human rights values starting out from fighting against rampant piracy and slave trade in the region.

Reaching peace and stability between, and within, the warring tribes was not an easy task, especially with a prolonged history of fighting and discord. In fact, the colonial concept of “divide and conquer” or “divide and rule” did not apply to the case of the Gulf. The region was divided tribally before the arrival of Britain, which has approached, ‘rapproched’ and mitigated disharmony between dispersed tribal domains. The strategic endeavours will ensure long-term stability in the Gulf, hence will enable Britain to remain in the region with minimal cost. Any negligence or omission would allow a let-in for other regional and international powers to intervene and impose their political weight.

To evoke the examples, which are numerous, when Britain noticed massive expansion of Ibn Saud, specifically after the discovery of oil, on the territories of the small Emirates that were actually under the “Protection Treaties”. Britain offered in 1952 to mediate as an arbiter between the Kingdom of Ibn Saud and its neighbouring Emirates, which have been described by the Foreign Office in a secret memorandum that they, “singly or in combination, are unlikely to be an effective barrier to Saudi aggression”. The memorandum continues, “It is extremely doubtful how far they could maintain their independent existence against their larger neighbours without outside help. Although in the past it would have been within our power to defend these States against all aggression (relying on Indian forces) it is unfortunately no longer true that we can afford them protection against aggression from outside the Middle East area and now the power of Saudi Arabia is for the first time a significant threat . This creates a new problem for us in fulfilling our obligations towards these States.” [3]

Normalizing and improving relations was not confined only between the littoral Sheikhs, but reached up to those ruling Sheikhs and their people. Periodic reports and correspondence between the Political Agents and the Political Resident were expressing frankly the violations and poor local management, offering solutions and actions to absorb emerging crises. In February 2nd of 1924 the British Political Resident in Bushire Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Trevor sent a letter to the British Government to report what he described as “outrage by Sunni tribesmen, at the instigation of members of Al Khalifa family, against the Shiah Bahranah population”. In his letter, Trevor recounted that he witnessed a demonstration of “Bahranah who all started shouting “justice” and other words to the same effect – shouting perhaps is too strong a word: groaning or moaning the words might be suitable (…). It may be mentioned here that the result of the support which we have given to the Baharnah during the past two or three years and the introduction of the reforms, was very apparent in this demonstration. The Baharnah would no more have dared to do such a thing a few years ago than fly over the moon.” The political Resident, who hoped to have a deterrent effect and tended to prevent future outrage of the sort, concluded his letter reassured that Sheikh Hamad bin Isa bin Ali, who was in charge of governance at the time, is punishing the offenders in an exemplary manner. For a brief period, that has been achieved. [4]

In February 1933, the year following the discovery of oil in Bahrain, in the succession ceremony of Hamad bin Isa bin Ali Al-Khalifa as ruler of Bahrain, when the British Political Agent in Bahrain Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Loch delivered a speech on behalf of the Viceroy of India, he did not hesitate to offer a frank advice to the new successor urging him that “the mark of a good Ruler that his concern should be, not for his own welfare, but for that of his people, and in these days especially a modern Ruler has to take part in many activities for the prosperity, safety and advancement of his state.” [5]

What has renewed today? How does the British government see its role and responsibility associated with reinforcing its military presence in the Gulf? Is it linked, as accusations point, with silence in respect to the ongoing human rights violations in Bahrain (home of the naval base) and other Gulf countries? Or, is it a return back to complete solidifying internal peace and political reform as an essential preamble to impel security and stability in the region? In this case, the British government would continue from where it left off in 1971. This requires re-gathering the small Sheikhdoms and imposing balances to repel the dominance of the “bigger”. Taking a step in this direction should hasten the settlement of border disputes followed, or perhaps preceded, by steps to improve relations between the ruling tribes.

Reforming the political systems, as we as the economic and the judicial in parallel, are the most prominent tasks ahead of the British government. Not easy, but possible. Despite the expected Gulf regimes’ evasion of reform entitlements, the urgent need for an international partner, in a level such as Britain, will necessitate them to listen and gradually disengage from the deliberate idleness of the transition to constitutional monarchies. Britain can, if she wants to positively affect the direction of mitigating the centralisation of powers in hands of the ruling families in favour of democratic institutions. That could require, what the United States have failed in, consolidating the rulers of Gulf Arab states against the Iranian hegemony concerns and providing assurances to preserve the royal hereditary paradigm. On the other hand, it also requires uplifting the peoples from the classification of subjects to the status of citizens.

The best return of reinforcing the British presence in the Gulf is to reflect the situation of “winner-winner-winner”, where its three benefiting parties are the peoples, the ruling elites and Britain. Achieving this may need extra presence.

_________________________________
[1]: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34690895
[2]: Confidential FO memorandum respecting British interests in the Persian Gulf, 12 Feb. 1908, IOR/L/PS/18/B166.
[3]: Secret FO memorandum “Saudi Arabian Frontier Disputes”, 19 Dec. 1952, CAB/129/57.
[4]: Confidential Letter from the Hon’ble Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., O.I.E, Political Resident in Persian Gulf, No. 89-S., Dated Bushire, the 2nd (received 11th) February 1924.
[5]: Speech of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Loch on behalf of the Viceroy of India in the succession ceremony of Hamad bin Isa bin Ali Al-Khalifa as ruler of Bahrain. 9 February 1933.