By Ghazal Aryahi
On the night of June 13, Tehran narrowly escaped a sweeping assault that, according to some estimates, aimed to topple its political system and recreate the scene of April 9, 2003—when Baghdad fell to its adversaries and the regional balance of power was turned on its head.
Tehran survived, but the confrontation is far from over. The possibility of escalation remains very real, and there are no clear signs that Israel has closed the chapter on the recent war, despite the pain inflicted by Iran’s missile response.
The Iranian leadership has characterized this phase as one of “no war, no peace.” In any case, this state of limbo raises more questions than answers: How did Iran reach this war? Was it an inevitable outcome or the result of years of cumulative missteps? And what might the next war look like?
As part of its “indirect deterrence” strategy, Iran constructed a network of regional allies forming what has come to be known as the “rings of fire” encircling Israel. Chief among these was Hezbollah in Lebanon, which many observers view as having evolved from a local resistance movement into a regional actor. Yet its prolonged involvement in Syria significantly diminished its standing among Arab publics and exposed it to increasing intelligence breaches.
Hezbollah’s entry into the Syrian conflict reshaped its image and reduced its ability to function as an effective lever during moments of high tension.
In Gaza, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had wagered that Israeli captives would force the Israeli government to the negotiating table, and that the international community would not remain silent in the face of Gaza’s looming annihilation. While this was a humanitarian calculation, from a military perspective it underestimated the extent of brutality the Israeli side might resort to, as well as the magnitude of international silence that could prevail.
As the conflict expanded, Iran’s leverage eroded. The “rings of fire” became noticeably dimmer than before.
Back to 2003: An Early Strategic Miscalculation
It may be useful to revisit what transpired in 2003, when the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein collapsed. Despite the bitter enmity and years of pain between Baghdad and Tehran, Saddam’s regime functioned in practical terms as a bulwark against Israeli influence in the eastern Arab world.
Following his fall, Iraqi airspace became exposed to U.S.—and by extension, Israeli—air power, while Iran’s influence remained confined to the ground with no air or technological cover. This strategic imbalance mirrors later developments in Syria and Lebanon, where Iran maintained allies on the ground but lacked the aerial or technological superiority necessary to consolidate its influence.
Some argue that Iran could have pursued a different path—one in which it preserved regional equilibrium by developing its missile capabilities while tolerating the existence of a hostile but containable regime, rather than contributing, even implicitly, to regime change. That approach, they suggest, might have avoided the strategic vacuum that followed.
This perspective tends to overlook the significant political and on-the-ground gains Iran made in Iraq. Still, its proponents contend that these gains came at a steep price—both politically and militarily—and that they ultimately failed to deliver decisive or transformative outcomes in the critical moment of June 13.
Vienna Talks: When Iran Held the Upper Hand
In the Vienna negotiations over the nuclear deal, Iran appeared to hold a strong bargaining position, particularly when it increased its uranium enrichment from 20% to 60% ahead of the fifth round, imposing a new negotiating reality on the Americans.
This leverage was enabled at the time by a cohesive network of regional influence that provided Iran with substantial pressure cards. Today, however, with the erosion of that network, a return to the negotiating table would likely require Iran to make larger and more multidimensional concessions.
Should an agreement with Washington materialize, it would likely entail gradual Iranian concessions on key issues: uranium enrichment under its nuclear program and potentially a significant reduction in its regional influence.
One red line, however, remains intact—the missile program. The Iranians are unlikely to allow themselves—let alone others—to cross it.
Tehran may be hoping to strike a deal that allows it to retain partial enrichment rights in exchange for scaling back regional activities and opening its economy to American investment. Still, such a scenario remains questionable, not only due to Washington’s position but also because of Israel’s categorical opposition to any arrangement that preserves what it perceives as Iran’s “strategic ambiguity.”
The New Middle East: What Role for Iran?
Amidst these shifting dynamics, Iran stands at a critical crossroads: will it pursue the development of a nuclear weapon, as India and Pakistan once did through secret testing programs only later detected by satellite surveillance? Or will it continue to wield the prospect of an agreement with Washington as a tactical pressure point?
Both paths carry significant risks and their success depends on Tehran’s ability to rebuild balanced strategic alliances.
Following the war, it appears that Iranian foreign policy will be compelled to undergo a serious reassessment.
Relations with Russia, despite Iran’s provision of thousands of drones to support Moscow in its war on Ukraine, have yet to yield direct political dividends in times of crisis. Tehran has endured international scrutiny and sanctions over its drone program without receiving corresponding strategic backing.
As for Iran’s large neighbor to the south, Saudi Arabia’s conspicuous neutrality opens the door to a more flexible approach aimed at stabilizing and potentially improving bilateral relations.
With China, Iran continues to see a crucial economic partner. It would be prudent to deepen that trajectory, though Beijing is unlikely to assume a military alliance role—now or in the foreseeable future.
One of the more striking developments during the recent war was Pakistan’s supportive stance, which may provide an opening to revisit and strengthen bilateral ties.
Turkey, too, presents an opportunity for renewed coordination based on shared interests. Any Iranian vacuum in the region could be exploited in ways that destabilize areas critical to Ankara’s security. In that sense, the message to Turkey must be unmistakable: “If we fall, you’re next on Tel Aviv’s list.”
One of the enduring challenges in Iranian foreign policy lies in its reliance on political and paramilitary proxies rather than investment in formal, balanced diplomatic relationships.
Over time, this approach has pushed several Arab states toward estrangement from Iran and into closer alignment with Israel, often under the banner of shared security concerns.
It may be time for Iran to reconsider this model and shift from “proxy-based deterrence” toward building alliances grounded in mutual interests and reciprocal respect for sovereignty.
Inside Iran: From Tension to Cohesion
On the domestic front, the war revealed a notable phenomenon: at the height of external threat, segments of the Iranian population rallied around the state, regardless of their political orientation. It was as if the war moment redefined the notion of “homeland” as something broader than the governing authority, creating a form of social cohesion.
This climate may provide the regime with an opening to review certain domestic policies, including restrictions on civil liberties and limits on public dissent.
Still, the primary challenge remains economic. The crisis is deep-rooted, exacerbated by sanctions and limited external engagement, and it continues to pose the greatest threat to internal stability.
Iran survived a critical moment of chaos, but the broader picture remains unresolved. Power alone is no longer sufficient to secure influence, and resistance alone no longer guarantees deterrence.
What is now required is a comprehensive reengineering of Iran’s strategic posture—one that begins domestically, extends regionally, and culminates at the negotiating table with global powers.
The challenge is no longer merely to survive, but to survive wisely—with minimal loss and maximal gain.